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ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN PRIVATE CIVIL RICO
ACTIONS
In 1970 Congress enacted the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO)' provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act.2 In
enacting RICO Congress intended to halt the infiltration of organized crime
into the American economy.' Congress, therefore, provided in RICO new
civil and criminal penalties as weapons in the war against organized crime.
4
One of the new weapons Congress provided in RICO was a private civil
cause of action.' Unlike state law actions designed to combat organized
crime and racketeering, the private civil RICO action allows plaintiffs injured
by a person's violation of section 1962 of RICO to recover treble damages
and attorney's fees.6 Because of the attractive remedies available under
RICO, plaintiffs increasingly have turned to RICO for compensation of
injuries.7 To bring a successful private civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)). The Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions are Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act.
Id.
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
3. Id., 84 Stat. at 922-23 (Statement of Findings and Purpose). Although the Statement
of Findings and Purpose precedes the Organized Crime Control Act rather than specifically
preceding the RICO provisions, the Statement also applies to RICO because a similar statement
accompanied Senate Bill 1861, the predecessor of RICO. STATEmENT OF FNDINGS AND STATE-
mENT oF PoLIcY oF S. 1861, 115 CoNG. REc. 9568 (1969); see United States v. Thompson,
685 F.2d 993, 1003 (6th Cir. 1982) (Lively, J., dissenting) (stating that Statement of Findings
and Purpose before Organized Crime Control Act has primary application to titles within
Organized Crime Control Act); H.R. REP. No. 217, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1969) (stating
that Senate Bill 1861 was predecessor of RICO); Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTmz DAME L. Rzv. 237, 248 n.28 (1982) (stating
that Statement of Findings and Purpose before Organized Crime Control Act applies to RICO).
4. Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. at 922-23 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
The Statement of Findings and Purpose states that Congress designed the Organized Crime
Control Act and RICO to provide new legal tools to supplement the existing tools available
in the fight against organized crime. Id. Congress thought that the existing remedies were too
limited in scope and impact, and, therefore, Congress enhanced the available evidence gathering
procedures, civil and penal sanctions, and remedies. Id.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (providing private parties with federal claim against
persons who injure plaintiffs by violating § 1962 of RICO).
6. See id. (providing that plaintiff injured as result of RICO violation shall recover
treble damages and attorney's fees).
7. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Irnrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985) (stating that although
plaintiffs initially used civil RICO provisions infrequently, plaintiffs recently have increased
dramatically use of RICO); Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section
of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 55 (1985) (noting that of 270 RICO decisions prior
to 1985, courts decided 3% throughout the 1970's, 2% in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982,
33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984).
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prove that a person" acting in connection with an enterprise9 whose activities
affect interstate or foreign commerce has committed predicate acts'0 that
constitute a pattern of racketeering activity," and, additionally, that the
racketeering activity injured the plaintiff.' 2 Plaintiffs typically have alleged
that by conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering, persons have violated section 1962(c) of RICO.' 3 Federal courts,
however, generally have held that both RICO's language and policy consid-
erations prohibit courts from holding a business enterprise liable as a person
under section 1962(c).14 To avoid section 1962(c) of RICO, therefore,
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1982) ( using term "person" to describe violator of acts
proscribed under RICO); id. § 1961(3) (defining term "person" under RICO); see also infra
notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing role of person under RICO).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1982) (describing relationship of person to enterprise in
different activities prohibited by RICO); id. § 1961(4) (defining term "enterprise" under
RICO); see also infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing role of enterprise under
RICO).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1982) (prohibiting person from participating in racket-
eering activity); id. § 1961(1) (defining term "racketeering activity"). Section 1961(1) of RICO
provides a list of offenses that constitute racketeering activity. Id. The list of racketeering
activities includes, among other things, acts or threats involving murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in dangerous drugs, wire fraud, mail fraud, and
securities fraud. Id.
11. See id. § 1962(a)-(c) (indicating that prohibited activity must constitute pattern of
racketeering activity); id. § 1961(5) (defining term "pattern of racketeering activity" as at least
two racketeering acts occurring within ten years of each other).
12. See id. § 1964(c) (requiring that plaintiff suffer injury in business or property before
plaintiff may bring private civil RICO action).
13. See Note, Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the
Misapplication of Vicarious Corporate Liability, 65 B. UNIv. L. REv. 561, 586 (1985) (rec-
ognizing that most civil RICO plaintiffs allege violations of § 1962(c)). Plaintiffs bring actions
under section 1962(c) of RICO because section 1962(c) requires plaintiffs to show only that a
person has conducted racketeering activity while participating in the affairs of an enterprise.
Id. at 567-68; see United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185, 186-87 (4th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
alleging violation of § 1962(c) not required to show enterprise has financially benefitted from
pattern of racketeering activity); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) (prohibiting person from conducting
affairs of enterprise through pattern racketeering activity); see also infra note 23 (providing
statutory language of § 1962(c)). Plaintiffs may allege violations of RICO section 1962(c) more
frequently than sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) because, unlike sections 1962(a) and 1962(b),
section 1962(c) does not require evidence of the source of the racketeering income or control
of the enterprise. See Note, supra, at 567-68. Under section 1962(a) plaintiffs must show that
a person has received racketeering income. See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston,
793 F.2d 28, 31 n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that under § 1962(a) plaintiff must show source
of racketeering income and prove that funds were channeled into enterprise); 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a) (1982) (prohibiting person from receiving income derived from racketeering activity);
see also infra note 21 (providing statutory language of § 1962(a)). Under section 1962(b)
plaintiffs must show that a person has acquired or maintained an interest in or control of an
enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982) (prohibiting person from acquiring or maintaining
interest in or control of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity); see also infra note
22 (providing statutory language of § 1962(b)).
14. See Garbade v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213 (10th Cir.
1987) (holding that same entity may not be simultaneously both enterprise and person liable
1448
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plaintiffs in civil RICO actions have attempted to reach the deep pocket of
the business enterprise by alleging that the enterprise is liable under section
1962(a) or section 1962(b) of RICO. 5
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RICO STATUTE
Section 1964 establishes the civil remedies available under RICO.
16
Section 1964(a) authorizes federal district courts to implement drastic civil
remedial measures to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of
RICO.' 7 Section 1964(b) empowers the Attorney General to bring a civil
cause of action under RICO." Section 1964(c) creates a private civil RICO
cause of action for any person whose business or property suffers injury
resulting from a violation of section 1962.19'
under § 1962(c) of RICO); Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir.
1986) (same); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 30-31 (1st Cir.
1986) (same); Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308, 314-15 (2nd Cir.)
(same), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 3266 (1985); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refin. Co., 751 F.2d 628,
633 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d
384, 399-401 (7th Cir. 1984) (same), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985);
Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d
1053, 1061-62 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1006 (1984); United States v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1982). But
see United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 986-90 (11th Cir.) (holding that enterprise may be
person under § 1962(c)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1982); infra note 63 (discussing Eleventh
Circuit's decision in United States v. Hartley to hold enterprise as person under § 1962(c));
infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's decision in Haroco Inc.
v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago to prohibit enterprise from being person
under § 1962(c)).
15. See, e.g., Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1397
(9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs identify corporate enterprise as person under §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b),
rather than under § 1962(c)); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645, 671 (E.D. Cal. 1986)
(plaintiffs arguing that although enterprise may not be person under § 1962(c), enterprise may
be person under § 1962(a)); Kredietbank v. Morris, No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986) (available
on NVTLAw, allfeds database) (plaintiffs argue that enterprise may be person under § 1962(a)
even though enterprise may not be person under § 1962(c)); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 427 (D. Minn. 1986) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 829 F.2d
648 (8th Cir. 1987).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
17. Id. § 1964(a). Section 1964(a) of RICO states that the federal district courts may
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 by issuing orders including, but not limited to,
ordering any person to divest himself of an interest in any enterprise, imposing reasonable
restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, or ordering the dissolution
or reorganization of any enterprise. Id. The courts must, however, make due provision for
the rights of innocent parties not involved in the racketeering activity. Id.
18. Id. § 1964(b).
19. Id. § 1964(c). Section 1964(c) of RICO states as follows:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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Section 1962 lists the activities proscribed by RICO? ° Section 1962(a)
forbids any person who has received income from a pattern of racketeering
activity from investing the income in an enterprise.2' Section 1962(b) pro-
hibits any person from acquiring or maintaining control of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.? Section 1962(c) forbids any
person employed by or associated with an enterprise from conducting the
affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.2 Section
1962(d) prohibits any person from conspiring to violate subsections (a), (b),
or (c) of section 1962.4
In proscribing different racketeering activities, section 1962 provides
that only a person may be a defendant in a civil RICO action.2 1 Section
20. Id. § 1962; see infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing subsections of §
1962).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). Section 1962(a) of RICO states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal . . . to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
Id.
22. Id. § 1962(b). Section 1962(b) of RICO states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
23. Id. § 1962(c). Section 1962(c) of RICO states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id.
24. Id. § 1962(d). To establish that a person has violated section 1962(d) of RICO, a
party must show that the person agreed to participate in racketeering activity prohibited by
sections 1962(a), 1962(b), or 1962(c) of RICO. United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 220-
21 (3d Cir. 1983) , cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1984); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880,
903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). Courts have held, therefore, that if an
enterprise may not be a person who violates sections 1962(a), 1962(b), or 1962(c), an enterprise
may not be a person who violates section 1962(d) by conspiring to violate sections 1962(a),
1962(b), or 1962(c). See, e.g, Mohr v. Clair Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 86-2691 (E.D. Pa. May
20, 1987) (available on WESTLAW, allfeds database) (holding that because plaintiff's claims
alleging enterprise as person fail under §§ 1962(a) and (c), plaintiff's claims alleging that
enterprise conspired to violate §§ 1962(a) and 1962(c) in violation of RICO § 1962(d) fail
also); Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(holding that plaintiff, under § 1962(d) of RICO, may not show conspiracy to violate § 1962(c)
of RICO without showing separate person and enterprise); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,
628 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that because enterprise may not be
person who violates §§ 1962(a) or 1962(c) of RICO, enterprise may not conspire to violate §§
1962(a) or 1962(c) of RICO).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982) (prohibiting any person from violating subsections
of § 1962).
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1961(3) of RICO broadly defines the term "person" to include any individ-
ual or entity capable of holding a beneficial interest in property.26 To violate
RICO, the person must invest in,27 acquire or maintain control of,2 or
conduct activity through29 an enterprise. 30 Section 1961(4) of RICO defines
the term "enterprise" to include any individual or legal entity, or any group
of individuals associated in fact though not a legal entity.3' To prove the
existence of an enterprise, a RICO plaintiff must establish, first, that the
entity exists as an ongoing organization, second, that those associated with
the organization function as a continuing unit, and, third, that the enterprise
exists separate from the pattern of racketeering in which the enterprise is
engaging. 32 The enterprise, however, does not have to consist of a formal
or legal organization. 3  Courts agree that an entity may be both a person
26. Id. § 1961(3).
27. Id. § 1962(a); see supra note 21 and accompanying text (providing statutory language
of § 1962(a)).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982); see supra note 22 and accompanying text (providing
statutory language of § 1962(b)).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982); see supra note 23 and accompanying text (providing
statutory language of § 1962(c)).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1982) (requiring existence of person and enterprise for
violation of § 1962); id. § 1961(4) (defining term "enterprise" under RICO); see also United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (stating that existence of enterprise is necessary
element of RICO claim).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). Section 1961(4) of RICO states that an enterprise may
be an individual, a partnership, a corporation, an association, or any other legal entity, or
merely a union or group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal entity. Id.
32. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1980) (stating criteria for showing
that enterprise exists). An enterprise does not have to consist of the same individuals throughout
its existence to satisfy the requirement that the enterprise function as a continuing unit. See
United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that individuals may
leave enterprise and new individuals may join at later time), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1984);
United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664-65 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that different individuals
may manage affairs of enterprise at different times), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1983). An
enterprise, however, must have some continuity of structure and personality. See Riccobene,
709 F.2d at 222 (finding that activities of individuals in loansharking and numbers operations
indicated continuous hierarchical structure composed of leader, inner group of advisors, and
unidentified lower level associates); Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 664-65 (holding that two different
associations with common members did not constitute single enterprise). To establish that an
enterprise exists apart from the pattern of racketeering activity, a plaintiff does not need to
show that the enterprise has some function unrelated to racketeering activity. See Riccobene,
709 F.2d at 223-24 (holding that organization that conducted loansharking and numbers
operations constituted enterprise); Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 665 (stating that prostitution ring may
constitute enterprise). A plaintiff must show merely that the enterprise has functioned in some
way apart from the alleged predicate racketeering acts. See Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 223-24
(finding that structure of loansharking and numbers operation had clearinghouse and coordi-
nation function above and beyond that necessary to carry out one of alleged predicate acts);
Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 665 (stating that proof of distinct structure could be demonstrated by
evidence that organization engaged in diverse patterns of racketeering activity). Proof of an
organization that regularly oversees and coordinates the commission of different racketeering
activities would satisfy the separate existence requirement. Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 223-24.
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (providing that enterprise may be legal entity or
1988] 1451
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and an enterprise under the definitions provided in section 1961 of RICO.34
Courts disagree, however, on whether an entity simultaneously may be a
person and an enterprise under section 1962 of RICO.3 5 Accordingly, courts
disagree on whether a private civil plaintiff may recover from an enterprise
as a person for injuries resulting from a violation of section 1962.36
The language of RICO specifically does not indicate whether Congress
intended for enterprises to be liable to private civil plaintiffs for violations
of section 1962.3 When statutory language is plain, and when Congress
gives no indication that courts should read a statute differently, courts
should regard the language of the statute as conclusive and should literally
construe the statute. When statutory language is ambiguous, however,
courts must probe the legislative history and policies behind the statute to
derive Congress' intent.3 9 Courts, therefore, must examine RICO's policy
objectives to determine whether Congress intended for an enterprise to be
liable as a person for violations of section 1962.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE PoLICiEs OF RICO
Congress designed RICO to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate busi-
nesses by organized crime 0 In drafting RICO Congress considered the
merely association in fact). Section 1961(4) of RICO describes two classes of enterprises. Id.;
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981). The first class of enterprise encompasses
legal entities like corporations and partnerships. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581. The second class
of enterprise consists of a group of individuals who have no legally recognized structure but
merely are an association in fact. Id. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the
association in fact enterprise encompasses not only legal organizations, but also illegal organ-
izations that control activities like illegal gambling and loansharking. See Turkette, 452 U.S.
at 580-91 (holding that neither statutory language nor legislative history indicate that scope of
enterprise should be limited to legal entities); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text
(discussing criteria for determining whether entity qualifies as enterprise).
34. See Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 400
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that corporation may satisfy definitions of both person and enterprise
under § 1961), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 1985); Schofield v. First
Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1986) (same); see 18 U.S.C. §
1961(3) (1982) (providing definition of term "person"); id. § 1961(4) (providing definition of
term "enterprise").
35. See infra notes 65-141 and accompanying text (discussing different interpretations of
whether enterprise may be person under § 1962 of RICO).
36. Compare Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that enterprise may be liable to private plaintiff as person for injuries
resulting from violation of §§ 1962(a) or 1962(b)) with Mohr v. Clair Ins. Agency, Inc., No.
86-2691 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1987) (holding that enterprise may not be liable as person under
any subsection of § 1962).
37. See United States v. Local 560, Int. Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 283-86
(D.N.J. 1984) (stating that nothing in RICO statute indicates that person and enterprise
elements must be mutually exclusive), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1985);
Blakey, supra note 3, at 287-88 (stating that nothing on face of RICO statute compels
conclusion that enterprise may not be person).
38. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
39. See D. SAINS, SUTRLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02 (4th ed. 1973) (stating
that one should solve statutory ambiguity by examining legislative history of statute).
40. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
1452
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existing penal sanctions available against individuals involved in organized
crime inadequate to remove criminal influence from legitimate business
endeavors. 4' Therefore, to attack the economic base through which organized
criminals threatened the American economy, Congress fashioned new crim-
inal and civil remedies. 42 Congress envisioned the civil provisions as the
foundation of RICO, 43 from which the federal courts could fashion a broad
range of relief to rid the enterprise infiltrated by organized crime of its
criminal element. 44 The civil RICO provisions authorize the federal courts
to issue a panoply of remedial orders, including divestiture of funds from
persons involved in the infiltrated enterprise, imposition of restrictions on
the activities of people involved in the racketeering activities of the enter-
prise, and dissolution or reorganization of the infiltrated enterprise.45 Con-
gress explicitly directed the courts to construe liberally any ambiguous
language of RICO to effectuate the remedial goals of RICO.
46
By providing private plaintiffs and attorneys general with the new civil
remedies, Congress hoped to deter racketeering activity in situations in
which criminal sanctions were either inadequate or impossible to impose. 47
Congress realized that the new civil remedies were more flexible, required
a lesser standard of proof, and were more effective in actually removing
organized crime from the infiltrated enterprise than existing criminal pen-
alties. 4 Congress designed the civil remedies of RICO primarily to remove
the corrupting element from legitimate businesses rather than to punish
wrongdoers.
49
(Statement of Findings and Purpose); see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981)
(stating that Congress primarily designed RICO to protect legitimate businesses from infiltration
by racketeers).
41. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
(Statement of Findings and Purpose). Congress designed RICO to provide new legal tools to
deal with the unlawful activities of persons engaged in organized crime. Id.; see supra note 4
and accompanying text (indicating that Congress thought that before enactment of RICO,
tools available to fight organized crime were inadequate).
42. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969); see 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982)
(providing criminal penalties of fines up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to 25 years for
persons violating § 1962 of RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982) (providing attorney general and
private parties with civil causes of action against persons violating § 1962); see supra notes
16-19 and accompanying text (discussing civil remedies of RICO statute).
43. See 115 CoNo. REc. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska on Senate Bill 1861, a
preliminary version of RICO) (stating that Congress intended criminal provisions of RICO
primarily to be adjunct to civil provisions).
44. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (c) (1982) (providing courts with power to grant
injunctive and monetary relief).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982); supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing §
1964(a) of RICO).
46. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947
(providing that courts should construe RICO liberally to effectuate RICO's remedial purposes).
47. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 43, at 82 (noting advantages that RICO's civil
provisions had over existing criminal statutes).
48. See id. (stating reasons why Congress hoped RICO's civil remedies would supplement
existing methods of fighting racketeering).
49. See id. at 160 (stating that Congress designed RICO § 1964 to be remedial, rather
19881 1453
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Although Congress established the civil remedies of RICO primarily to
protect legitimate businesses from infiltration by persons conducting rack-
eteering activity, Congress also enacted RICO's civil remedies to achieve
other objectives.5 0 Congress intended RICO also to provide compensation
for parties injured as a result of violations of section 1962s1 and to achieve
a broader goal of clearing the lanes of American commerce of racketeering
activity.52 Congress, therefore, hoped that the private civil remedy -provided
in section 1964(c) of RICO would both compensate the injured plaintiff
and enhance the effectiveness of RICO's prohibitions against racketeering
activitys
3
When the business enterprise is the person who violates section 1962,
however, the legislative goals of RICO of rehabilitating the infiltrated
business and compensating the injured party can conflict . 4 Courts have
recognized that by imposing liability on the enterprise for violations of
section 1962, courts compensate the injured plaintiff. 5" The same courts
have recognized, however, that by holding the enterprise liable for violations
of section 1962, courts may contradict congressional intent by punishing
the infiltrated enterprise for whose benefit Congress drafted RICO.56 The
conflict between the policies of compensating the injured plaintiff under
section 1964(c) and of rehabilitating the enterprise infiltrated by organized
crime has resulted in different interpretations concerning an enterprise's civil
liability for violations of section 1962. 57 Some courts and commentators
than punitive). Congress provided for punishment of individual violators of RICO in RICO's
criminal provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) (providing criminal penalties for RICO
violations); supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing criminal penalties provided in
RICO).
50. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (stating that Congress enacted RICO
to provide remedy for parties injured by racketeering activity and to eliminate racketeering
influence from American economy).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (providing treble damages and attorney's fees for
individuals injured by reason of violation of § 1962).
52. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (stating that RICO's civil
provisions are useful in removing organized crime from American society).
53. Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals, before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 520 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 30]
(remarks of Representative Steiger); see 116 CONG. REc. 25190 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
McClellan, sponsor of RICO in Senate (stating that treble damages provision of § 1964(c) of
RICO would be major tool in eliminating organized crime from American economy).
54. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (noting that policies behind compensating
plaintiff and rehabilitating enterprise may conflict).
55. See Haroco v. Am. Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 401-02 (7th
Cir. 1984) (recognizing that allowing corporate enterprise liability for violations of § 1962
would provide deep pocket for private plaintiffs), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473
U.S. 606 (1985).
56. See id. (recognizing that corporate enterprise should not be liable for violation of §
1962 when enterprise is victim or passive instrument of racketeering activity).
57. See id. at 401 (indicating that competing policy arguments are responsible for different
views on whether enterprise may be person under § 1962 of RICO); infra notes 66-141 and
accompanying text (discussing different interpretations of whether private civil plaintiff may
recover from enterprise for violation of § 1962 of RICO).
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have found that because RICO specifically does not prohibit holding an
enterprise liable as a person, the enterprise should be liable for injuries the
enterprise causes from violations of section 1962.58 Other courts have held
that although RICO's language in section 1962(c) clearly envisions a mutually
exclusive person and enterprise, some enterprises may be liable for violations
of sections 1962(a) or 1962(b) without contravening congressional intent to
rehabilitate the enterprise victimized by racketeering activity. 9 Still other
courts have held that because holding the enterprise liable as a person would
frustrate RICO's policy to rehabilitate the infiltrated enterprise, the language
of all of section 1962 contemplates an enterprise different from the person 0
III. CASES INTERPRETNG THE ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IssuE
In most private civil RICO claims plaintiffs have alleged violations of
section 1962(c) . 6 Courts, therefore, usually have examined whether an entity
may be simultaneously an enterprise and a person under section 1962(c).62
The overwhelming majority of courts have held that because section 1962(c)
of RICO requires the person to be employed by or associated with the
58. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 986-90 (lth Cir.) (holding that neither
statutory language nor congressional intent prevent enterprise from being person under § 1962
of RICO), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1982); Blakey, supra note 3, at 286-325 (stating that
because statutory language of RICO does not prohibit holding enterprise as person, courts
should hold enterprises liable as persons for violating § 1962 to effectuate remedial purposes
of RICO); infra note 64 (discussing Hartley). Professor Blakey describes the roles an enterprise
may play in a violation of section 1962 of RICO as those of victim, prize, instrument, or
perpetrator. Blakey, supra note 3, at 327. Professor Blakey states that the enterprise should
not be civilly liable as a person for violations of RICO when the enterprise is a victim or
prize. Id. at 307-23 Professor Blakey reasons that when the enterprise is a victim or prize the
enterprise plays no active role.in the racketeering activity. Id. at 307-23. Professor Blakey
states, however, that when an enterprise acts as an instrument or perpetrator in violating
section 1962 the enterprise should be civilly because the enterprise is involved in the racketeering
activity. Id.
59. See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 30-34 (1st
Cir. 1986) (holding that enterprise may be person under § 1962(a), but not under § 1962(c));
Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 400-02 (7th Cir.
1984) (same); Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Sev-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396-98
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that enterprise may be person under §§ 1962(a) or 1962(h), but not
under § 1962(c)); see infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (discussing Haroco); infra notes
92-109 and accompanying text (discussing Schreiber).
60. See Mohr v. Clair Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 86-2691 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1987) (available
on WasmTAw, allfeds database) (holding that enterprise may not be liable as person for violation
of any subsection of § 1962 of RICO); CATV Support Serv., Inc. v. Magnavox CATV Syst.,
Inc., No. 86-2276 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1987) (available on WasmAw, alfeds database) (same);
Kredietbank v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986) (available on WESTLAW,
allfeds database) (same).
61. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting that private civil RICO plaintiffs
most frequently allege violations of §1962(c) of RICO).
62. Id.
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enterprise, an enterprise may not be a person under section 1962(c).63 These
courts have reasoned that allowing an enterprise to be a person under
1962(c) would produce the anomalous result of having the enterprise em-
ployed by or associated with itself.64 For example, in Haroco, Inc. v.
American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,65 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether an enterprise may
63. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that enterprise may
not be person under § 1962(c)). The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that an enterprise may not be a person under section
1962(c) of RICO. Id. Only the Eleventh Circuit has held that an enterprise may be a person
under section 1962(c). See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 986-90 (11th Cir.) (holding
that corporation may be liable for violation of § 1962(c)), cert. denied, 659 U.S. 1170 (1982).
In Hartley the government alleged that Treasure Isle, Inc. (Treasure Isle) and an officer and
a manager of Treasure Isle violated RICO section 1962(c) by conducting a pattern of
racketeering activity through the enterprise, Treasure Isle. Id. at 965-66. The government
alleged, therefore, that Treasure Isle acted as both enterprise and person in violating section
1962(c). Id. at 988. The Hartley court noted that the statutory language of section 1962(c) of
RICO does not specifically prohibit an enterprise from being a person. Id. at 987-88. In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Congress mandated a liberal construction of RICO
to effectuate RICO's remedial purposes. Id. The Hartley court then offered three rationales
to support its conclusion that an entity can be both a person and an enterprise under section
1962(c) of RICO. Id. at 989-90. The Eleventh Circuit noted, first, that allowing a central
figure engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity to escape liability under RICO merely
because the complaint names the person as an enterprise would defy reason. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned, second, that there would be no pleading problem if the government had
charged the multiple defendants collectively as an association in fact, and charged Treasure
Isle singly as the enterprise. Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that because an independent
enterprise element existed, the Eleventh Circuit was satisfied with the form of the charges
against defendant. Id. The Hartley court noted, finally, that the court could have found the
defendant was both enterprise and person if the court had pierced the corporate veil. Id. at
989. The Eleventh Circuit explained that although the corporate defendant qualified as a
person under RICO, if the court had pierced the defendant's corporate veil, the court would
find a group of individuals associated in fact that would satisfy the enterprise requirement.
Id. The Hartley court held, therefore, that an enterprise may be a person under section 1962(c)
of RICO. Id. at 990.
In stating its second reason for holding the enterprise as a person, the Hartley court
apparently makes the mistake of thinking that an association in fact may qualify as a person
under RICO. Id. An association in fact, however, is a type of enterprise rather than a person.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the association in fact as enterprise). An
association in fact may not be a person because an association in fact may not hold an interest
in property. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (indicating that person must be able to hold
interest in property); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 727 F.2d 384,
401 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that Hartley court mistakenly believed that an association in fact
could be a person), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
64. See, e.g., United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 1319 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that
corporate enterprise logically may not be employed by or associated with itself); B.F. Hirsch
v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1985) (same); Rhoades v. Powell 644 F. Supp.
645, 672 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that enterprise may not be person under § 1962(c) because
person must be employed by or associated with enterprise); Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc. v.
Guerdon Indus., 644 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Del. 1986) (same).




be a person under section 1962(c) of RICO. 66 The plaintiffs in Haroco were
several businesses that borrowed money from American National Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago (ANB).67 The plaintiffs brought a private civil action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
against ANB, an officer and director of ANB, and the parent corporation
of ANB. 6 The plaintiffs alleged that by using the mails in furtherance of
a scheme to defraud the plaintiffs by overstating the plaintiffs' interest
rates, the defendants had conducted a pattern of racketeering activity. 69 The
plaintiffs also alleged that the plaintiffs suffered injury by having to pay
excessive interest rates to ANB. 70 The plaintiffs claimed that ANB was both
a person and an enterprise because ANB had conducted its own affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of section 1962(c) of
RICO. 7' The district court, however, did not consider whether ANB could
be both a person and an enterprise under section 1962(c) because the district
court dismissed the complaint on other grounds .2 The plaintiffs subsequently
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
73
On appeal the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's grounds for
dismissal and considered ANB's defense that ANB could not be simulta-
neously a person and an enterprise under section 1962(c). 74 The Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that a corporation could qualify as both a person and
an enterprise under section 1961 of RICO. 75 The Seventh Circuit also
recognized that Congress expressly instructed courts to construe liberally
the provisions of RICO. 76 The Haroco court found, however, that RICO's
language in section 1962(c) requiring the liable person to be employed by
or associated with the enterprise indicates that a person must be distinct
from the enterprise. 77 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the statutory
language is so clear, the court would not stretch the liberal construction
principle of RICO to reach the enterprise as a person under section 1962(c). 78
66. Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 727 F.2d 384, 385 (7th
Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 385-86. In Haroco the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated section
1962(c) of RICO by conducting a pattern of mail fraud through the enterprise, American
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago (ANB). Id. at 385; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1982) (listing
mail fraud as racketeering activity).
70. Haroco, 727 F.2d at 385.
71. Id. at 385-86.
72. Id. at 386. The district court in Haroco dismissed the plaintiffs' claim because the
plaintiffs failed to allege that the plaintiffs had suffered a racketeering injury in addition to
the predicate acts of mail fraud. Id.
73.Id. at 384.
74. See id. at 387-99 (holding that RICO claim does not require racketeering injury).
75. Id. at 400.
76. Haroco, 727 F.2d at 400; see supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' mandate to construe liberally provisions of RICO).
77. Haroco, 727 F.2d at 400.
78. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit held, therefore, that ANB could not be liable for
damages arising out of a violation of section 1962(c).
79
Although deciding that an enterprise could not be a person under
section 1962(c), the Haroco court recognized the competing policy consid-
erations of compensating the injured plaintiff on one hand and protecting
the victimized enterprise on the other. 80 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
by determining enterprise liability according to the role the enterprise plays
in the racketeering activity, courts could strike a balance between the
competing policy considerations. 8' The Haroco court stated that when the
enterprise is the perpetrator or central figure in the racketeering activity,
the enterprise should be liable as a person for injuries the enterprise causes.
2
The Seventh Circuit stated, however, that the enterprise should not be liable
when the enterprise is a victim or a passive instrument through which others
perpetrate racketeering activity.83
In considering the competing policy considerations, the Seventh Circuit
found that the language of section 1962 allows courts to resolve enterprise
liability according to the relationship the enterprise has with the prohibited
activity. 84 The Seventh Circuit stated that, unlike section 1962(c), section
1962(a) of RICO does not require the person to be employed by or associated
with the enterprise.85 The Seventh Circuit noted that, instead, section 1962(a)
prohibits a person from receiving income derived from a pattern of rack-
eteering activity and using that income to establish or operate an enterprise.86
The Seventh Circuit reasoned, therefore$ that when the enterprise uses the
proceeds of racketeering activity in its operations, an enterprise could be a
person under section 1962(a).17 The Seventh Circuit stated that if courts
79. Id.
80. Id. at 401-02. The Haroco court noted that the plaintiffs argued that corporate
enterprises should be liable for violations of section 1962(c) because Congress intended to
create a deep pocket for plaintiffs when corporate agents engage in a pattern of racketeering
that benefits the corporation. Id. at 401. The Haroco court also noted, however, that another
court had held that a corporate enterprise should not be liable as a person under section
1962(c) of RICO because the enterprise may be merely a passive instrument or victim of
racketeering activity. Id.; see Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 22, 23-24
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that corporate enterprise should not be liable for violating § 1962(c)
of RICO when corporation is victim of racketeering activity).
81. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401; see infra note 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing
when enterprise should be liable for violation of § 1962 of RICO). The Haroco court recognized
that under section 1962 of RICO, an enterprise may be either a victim, a prize, an instrument,
or perpetrator. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401; see supra note 58 (discussing Professor Blakey's
description of RICO enterprise as victim, prize, instrument, or perpetrator).
82. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 401-02.
85. See id. at 401-02.
86. Id.; see supra note 21 (providing statutory language of § 1962(a) of RICO).
87. Haroco, 727 F.2d at 402. The Seventh Circuit in Haroco did not hold specifically
that an enterprise may be a person under section 1962(a) of RICO because plaintiffs only
alleged that the enterprise violated section 1962(c). Id. The Seventh Circuit, however, subse-
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allowed enterprise liability under section 1962(a), courts would find the
enterprise liable under RICO only when the enterprise is actually the
beneficiary of the racketeering activity, and not merely when the enterprise
is the victim of the racketeering activity."8 The Haroco court also stated
that by allowing enterprise liability under section 1962(a), courts would
promote the primary purpose of RICO by reaching those persons who
ultimately profit from racketeering activity, rather than the persons who
are victims of racketeering activity. 9
Most courts considering whether an enterprise may be liable for a RICO
violation have agreed with the Haroco court that although an enterprise
may not be a person under section 1962(c), an enterprise may be liable for
a violation of section 1962(a).90 Additionally, some courts have extended
the reasoning of Haroco to impose liability on the enterprise under section
1962(b) of RICO as well as under section 1962(a). 9' For example, in Schreiber
Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co.2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether an enterprise may be a
culpable person under sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) of RICO. 93 In Schreiber
quently adopted the position advanced in Haroco. See Masi v. First City Bank & Trust Co.,
779 F.2d 397, 402-03 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that enterprise may be person under § 1962(a)
of RICO if enterprise is direct or indirect beneficiary of racketeering activity).
88. See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402 (stating that enterprise may be liable under § 1962(a)
when enterprise uses proceeds from pattern of racketeering activity).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358-61 (3d
Cir. 1987) (holding that although enterprise may not be liable under § 1962(c), enterprise may
be liable under § 1962(a) if enterprise is beneficiary of pattern of racketeering activity); Garbade
v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213-14 (10th Cir. 1987) (same);
Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 29-34 (Ist Cir. 1986) (same);
Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396-98 (9th Cir. 1986)
(same); Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, 657 F. Supp. 948, 954-57 (D. Del. 1987)
(same); Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315, 320-21 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (same);
Pennsylvania v. Derry Constr. Co., 617 F. Supp. 940, 943-44 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (same). But
see, e.g., United States v. Computer Science Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1189-91 (4th Cir. 1982)
(holding that enterprise may not be person under §§ 1962(a) or 1962(c)); H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 418, 426-28 (D. Minn. 1986) (same), affid on other
grounds, 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1194-
98 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
91. See, e.g., Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Wel Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396-98
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that enterprise may be person under §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) of RICO);
Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc. v. Guerdon Indus. Inc., 644 F. Supp. 951, 955-57 (D. Del.
1986) (same); Pennsylvania v. Derry Constr. Co., 617 F. Supp. 940, 943-44 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(same). But see, e.g., Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, 656 F. Supp. 555, 560-61 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) (holding that enterprise may be person under § 1962(a), but not under §§ 1962(b)
and 1962(c)); Medallion TV Enter. Inc. v. Select TV of California, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290,
1294-95 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that enterprise may not be person under §§ 1962(b) or
1962(c)); Bruss Co. v. A~lnet Communications Serv., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (holding that enterprise may be person under § 1962(a), but not under §§ 1962(b) and
1962(c)).
92. 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1986).
93. Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396-98 (9th Cir.
1986).
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the plaintiff sued Landmark Development Co. (Landmark), Serv-Well De-
velopment Co. (Serv-Well), and officers and owners of Landmark and Serv-
Well in the United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia. 94 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had violated section 1962(a)
by receiving income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and
using that income to operate the enterprises, Serv-Well and Landmark. 95
The plaintiff alleged also that the defendants had violated section 1962(b)
by maintaining an interest in or control of Serv-Well and Landmark through
a pattern of racketeering activity. 96 The plaintiff's complaint, thus, identified
Serv-Well and Landmark as both persons and enterprises under sections
1962(a) and 1962(b) of RICO. 97 The district court, however, dismissed the
plaintiff's RICO claims because the plaintiff failed to allege an enterprise
separate and distinct from the persons involved in the alleged racketeering
activity. 98 The plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit.9
On appeal the Schreiber court noted that courts generally have held
that an enterprise may not be a person under section 1962(c). 11 The Schreiber
court stated, however, that sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) do not prohibit
identity between persons and enterprises because, unlike section 1962(c),
sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) do not require the entities to be mutually
exclusive.101 The Ninth Circuit noted that an enterprise receiving income
from a pattern of activity in which the enterprise has engaged as a principal
clearly could invest that income in its own operations and thus violate
section 1962(a). l0 Agreeing with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in
Haroco, the Schreiber court held, therefore, that when an enterprise engag-
ing in racketeering activity is the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern
of racketeering activity, the enterprise may be liable under section 1962(a).103
94. Id. at 1395. In Schreiber the plaintiff was the exclusive distributor of Chambers
appliances in the 48 contiguous States. Id. The plaintiff alleged that defendants attempted to
by-pass the plaintiff as exclusive distributor by using Landmark Development Corporation
(Landmark) to divert goods to Serv-Well Furniture Company (Serv-Well). Id. To by-pass the
plaintiff, the defendants represented to Chambers that Landmark wished to distribute Chambers
goods in Canada and Alaska. Id. Because Landmark could distribute Chambers products in
Canada and Alaska without violating the distributorship agreement with the plaintiff, Chambers
sent its products to Landmark. Id. Landmark purchased the products with money provided
by Serv-Well, and then sent the products to Serv-Well for sale in the Los Angeles area. Id.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' use of mail fraud and wire fraud to carry out the
diversion scheme constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
95. Id. at 1396.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1397.
98. Id. at 1395.
99. Id. at 1393.
100. Id. at 1396-97.
101. Id. at 1397-99.
102. Id. at 1398.
103. See Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 402
(7th Cir. 1984) (stating that language of § 1962(a) allows enterprise to be person liable for
violation because enterprise receives income derived from racketeering activity under § 1962(a)).
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After holding that an enterprise may be liable as a person under section
1962(a), the Schreiber court stated, further, that section 1962(b) of RICO
was analogous to section 1962(a).'04 The Schreiber court explained that
whereas section 1962(a) prohibits persons from using money derived from
racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise, section 1962(b)
prohibits persons from engaging in racketeering activity to acquire or
maintain an interest in an enterprise.10 The Ninth Circuit noted that the
enterprise under section 1962(b), like the enterprise under section 1962(a),
necessarily must be the direct or indirect beneficiary of the racketeering
activity to qualify as a person. 1' 6 The Ninth Circuit reasoned, therefore,
that by imposing liability on the enterprise under sections 1962(a) and
1962(b), courts reach those persons who profit from racketeering without
harming innocent enterprises that are merely victims of racketeering activ-
ity. 107 Accordingly, the Schreiber court held that an entity may be both an
enterprise and a person under both sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) of RICO. 08
Unlike the Haroco and Schreiber courts, several courts have held that,
as with section 1962(c), the statutory language and congressional intent of
RICO prevent an enterprise from being a person under sections 1962(a) or
1962(b) or both.' 9 For example, in Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co."0 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York consid-
ered whether an enterprise may be a person under sections 1962(a) and
1962(c)."' In Rush the plaintiff brought suit against a securities brokerage
firm, Oppenheimer & Co. (Oppenheimer), and an employee of Oppenheimer
for violating sections 1962(a) and 1962(c) of RICO .112 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants had conducted a pattern of racketeering activity by
using mall fraud and wire fraud to make excessive trades on the plaintiff's
account at Oppenheimer and to make knowingly unsuitable recommenda-
tions to the plaintiff concerning the purchase of stocks." 3 The plaintiff





109. See, e.g., United States v. Computer Science Corp., 389 F.2d 1181, 1189-91 (4th
Cir.) (holding that enterprise may not be person under §§ 1962(a) or 1962(c)), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1170 (1982); Mohr v. Clair Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 86-2691 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1987)
(available on WVasnAw, alifeds database) (holding that enterprise may not be person under
any part of § 1962); CATV Support Serv., Inc. v. Magnavox CATV Sys., Inc., No. 86-2276
(S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1987) (available on WasTAw, allfeds database) (holding that corporate
enterprise may not be person under §§ 1962(a), 1962(b), or 1962(c) of RICO); Bruss Co. v.
Allnet Communications Serv., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D. 11. 1985) (holding that
enterprise may not be person under §§ 1962(b) or 1962(c)); see infra notes 133-41 (discussing
court's reasoning in Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communications Serv., Inc.)
110. 628 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
111. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1193-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
112. Id. at 1193.
113. Id. at 1189-90. In Rush the employee of Opperheimer & Co. (Oppenheimer) that
allegedly defrauded the plaintiff was a stockbroker and a registered representative of Oppen-
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named Oppenheimer as both an enterprise and a person in the RICO
claim." 4 The plaintiff alleged that by receiving income derived from the
employee's pattern of racketeering activity and using the proceeds of the
racketeering activity to operate Oppenheimer, Oppenheimer violated section
1962(a).1 5 The plaintiff alleged, further, that by conducting its own affairs
through a pattern of racketeering, Oppenheimer violated section 1962(c)." 6
The Rush court, however, dismissed the section 1962(c) claim for two
reasons." 7 First, the district court found that the statutory language of
section 1962(c) clearly prohibits an enterprise from being a person. " 8 Second,
the district court found that Congress did not intend for courts to hold
liable under section 1962(c) enterprises that may be passive instruments or
victims of racketeering activity." 9
In considering the plaintiff's section 1962(a) claim, the Rush court stated
that courts should not examine, ad hoc, an enterprise's role in a racketeering
scheme because Congress designed RICO to punish the perpetrators of
racketeering acts rather than the enterprises through which those persons
conduct their racketeering activity. 20 In finding that an enterprise may not
be a person under section 1962(a), the Rush court specifically rejected the
reasoning of the Haroco court.'2 ' The Rush court gave three reasons for
rejecting the Seventh Circuit's reasoning that an enterprise may be liable
for violations of section 1962(a).122 The court noted, first, that although a
person must operate through an enterprise to violate section 1962(c), section
1962(a) does not require any relationship between the person and the
enterprise. 2 3 The Rush court stated that the enterprise even may be the
bounty of the racketeering activity through which the perpetrator launders
racketeering income. '4 The Rush court reasoned, therefore, that if an
enterprise may not be liable as a person under section 1962(c), an enterprise
should not be liable as a person under section 1962(a) when the enterprise
may have no relation to the racketeering acts. 25 The district court noted,
second, that the use of the terms "person" and "enterprise" in sections
1962(a) and 1962(c) indicates that the relation between the two entities
heimer. Id. at 1189. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' untrue investment advice and
brokerage commissions cost him in excess of $300,000 in investment losses. Id. at 1190.
114. Id. at 1193.
115. Id. at 1193, 1196.
116. Id. at 1193.
117. Id. at 1193-96; see infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why
Rush court dismissed § 1962(c) claim against Oppenheimer).
118. Id. at 1194.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1196-97.
121. Id. at 1197.
122. Id.; see infra notes 124-28 (discussing Rush court's reasons not to hold enterprise as
a person under § 1962(a)).





should be the same under both sections. 126 The Rush court noted, finally,
that by allowing an enterprise to be a person under section 1962(a), courts
only would aggravate the use of the civil RICO statute for purposes other
than Congress' intended purpose of removing organized crime from legiti-
mate enterprises. 27 The Rush court indicated that an entity should be liable
as a person for racketeering acts only if the plaintiff can show that the
entity has infiltrated an enterprise.1 28 Thus, the Rush court held that an
enterprise could not be a person under either sections 1962(a) or 1962(c) of
RICO.
29
Several courts have extended the reasoning of the Rush court to exclude
the enterprise from RICO liability under section 1962(b), in addition to
sections 1962(a) and 1962(c).130 Some courts, however, have distinguished
section 1962(b) from section 1962(a).13 1 These courts have allowed enterprise
liability under section 1962(a), but have excluded the enterprise from liability
under section 1962(b). 3 2 For example, in Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communication
Services, Inc.,' the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois considered whether an enterprise may be a person under sections
1962(a), 1962(b), and 1962(c).1M The plaintiffs in Bruss alleged that Allnet
Communication Services, Inc. (A~lnet) and Allnet's executives, officers, and
directors violated sections 1962(a), 1962(b), and 1962(c) of RICO while
implementing a scheme to overcharge the plaintiffs for the long distance
telephone service that Allnet supplied to the plaintiffs. 3 5 The plaintiffs
claimed that Allnet acted as both a person and the enterprise for each
alleged violation of section 1962.136 Agreeing with the Haroco court, the
Bruss court held that an enterprise may not be a person under section
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1197-98.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Mohr v. Clair Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 86-2691 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1987)
(available on WEsThAw, allfeds database) (holding that enterprise may not be person under
any subsection of § 1962); CATV Support Serv., Inc. v. Magnavox CATV Syst., Inc., No.
86-2276 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1987) (available on VEsTLAw, alfeds database) (same); Kredietbank
v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986) (available on WEasTAw, aifeds
database) (same).
131. See Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, 656 F. Supp. 555, 560-61 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(holding that enterprise may be person under § 1962(a) of RICO, but not under §§ 1962(b)
and 1962(c)); Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communications Serv., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D.
I1. 1985) (same).
132. See Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, 656 F. Supp. 555, 560-61 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(holding that enterprise may be person under § 1962(a) of RICO, but not under §§ 1962(b)
and 1962(c)); Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communications Serv., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (same).
133. 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
134. Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communications Serv., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 406-07 (N.D.
Il1. 1985).
135. Id. at 403-04.
136. Id. at 406.
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1962(c), but that an enterprise maybe a person under section 1962(a). 37 In
considering whether an enterprise may be a person under section 1962(b),
the Bruss court stated that the language in section 1962(b) is similar to the
language in section 1962(c). 138 The district court noted that although section
1962(b) does not contain the language of section 1962(c) requiring the person
to be employed by or associated with the enterprise, section 1962(b) does
require that the person acquire or maintain an interest in or control of an
enterprise. 139 The Bruss court reasoned, therefore, that section 1962(b), like
section 1962(c), contemplates an enterprise that is the victim, rather than
the perpetrator, of the racketeering activity. t4° The Bruss court held, ac-
cordingly, that an enterprise may be liable as a person under section 1962(a),
but is immune from liability under sections 1962(b) and 1962(c).1
41
IV. REACHING THE ENTERPRISE UNDER SECTION 1964(c) OF RICO
The federal courts inconsistently have determined whether a private civil
RICO plaintiff may recover from an enterprise for injuries resulting from
a violation of section 1962 because the statutory language does not specif-
ically indicate Congress' intent on the issue. 42 Unfortunately, the legislative
history of RICO also provides courts with little specific guidance of Con-
gress' intent in providing the private civil RICO remedy of section 1964(c).'
43
In proposing the private civil damages provision, however, proponents of
section 1964(c) intended to enhance the effectiveness of RICO's prohibitions
against racketeering activity. 44 Congress also stated that courts should
construe liberally provisions of RICO to effectuate RICO's remedial pur-
poses.145 Courts thus should read section 1964(c) along with the other civil





142. Compare Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384,
401-02 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (stating that
language of RICO § 1962(a) allows courts to hold enterprise liable as person); supra notes 65-
89 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's decision in Haroco) with Rush v.
Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that language
of § 1962(a) indicates need for distinct enterprise and person); supra notes 110-29 and
accompanying text (discussing district court's decision in Rush).
143. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (noting that Congress
made few legislative statements* concerning civil remedy provisions of RICO with specific
reference to § 1964(c)); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d
384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that legislative history of RICO contains little material on §
1964(c)).
144. Hearings on S. 30, supra note 53, at 520 (remarks of Rep. Steiger); see 116 CONG.
REc. 25190 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan, sponsor of S. 30) (stating that treble damage
remedy would be major tool in eliminating organized crime.
145. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
947 (stating that courts should construe liberally provisions of RICO to effectuate RICO's




remedies provided in section 1964 as part of Congress' initiative against
racketeering activity, and should construe section 1964(c) in ways that
effectuate RICO's remedial initiative. 46 Therefore, if the statutory language
of RICO does not prohibit enterprise liability and if holding the enterprise
liable would promote the remedial purposes of RICO, courts should hold
the enterprise liable to the private plaintiff for injuries resulting from
violations of section 1962.147
The statutory language of RICO requires that a private civil plaintiff
must show that the defendant has conducted activity prohibited by section
1962 to recover under section 1964(c). 148 The term "person" in section 1962
describes the perpetrator or the defendant in the private civil action. 49 The
term "enterprise" in section 1962 describes the entity with which the person
must have some type relation. 5 0 Because section 1962 clearly provides that
only a person may violate RICO, an enterprise may be liable to a private
civil RICO plaintiff only if the enterprise also is a person.Y
5 '
An enterprise clearly may be a person under section 1961 of RICO.
52
Section 1961 merely requires that a person be an entity capable of holding
an interest in property.153 Section 1962, however, requires that an entity
have a certain relation to an enterprise to qualify as a person who violates
RICO. 154 An enterprise, therefore, must be able to hold an interest in
146. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (stating that courts
should read private civil remedy provision as one of the novel remedies Congress provided in
RICO to fight organized crime on all fronts); supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text
(discussing purposes of remedial provisions of RICO).
147. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) (stating that courts
should not eliminate RICO's private damage remedy in situations in which Congress provided
remedy).
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (providing that any person injured in business or
property from violation of § 1962 may recover treble damages and attorney's fees under
RICO).
149. See id. § 1962(a)-(c) (prohibiting any person from performing enumerated activities);
supra notes 21-24 (describing different activities proscribed by § 1962 of RICO).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1982) (requiring that person invest in, acquire or maintain
control of, or conduct activity through enterprise to violate RICO); see supra notes 31-33
(describing characteristics of enterprise under RICO).
151. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (stating that only person may be defendant
in civil RICO action).
152. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) (defining term "person" to include any
individual capable of holding beneficial interest in property) with id. § 1961(4) (defining term
"enterprise" to include any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any group of individuals associated in fact). See supra note 34 and accompanying
text (noting that courts agree that entity may be both enterprise and person under definitions
provided in § 1961 of RICO).
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) (defining term "person" under RICO).
154. See id. § 1962(a) (requiring that person receive money obtained through racketeering
activity and use or invest that money in enterprise to establish RICO violation); id. § 1962(b)
(requiring that person acquire or maintain interest in or control of enterprise to establish RICO
violation); id. § 1962(c) (requiring that person employed by or associated with enterprise
conduct affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity to establish RICO
violation).
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property and must have a specific relation to itself to be a person liable
for violating section 1962.15
Sections 1962(a), 1962(b), and 1962(c) each describe different types of
persons having different types of relationships with their respective enter-
prises. 5 6 Section 1962(c) requires that a person be employed by or associated
with the enterprise and, additionally, that the person conduct or participate
in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.'
5 7
The language of section 1962(c) clearly indicates that the drafters of RICO
envisioned a mutually exclusive person and enterprise in section 1962(c).' 5 8
Allowing an enterprise to be a person under section 1962(c) would place
the enterprise in the anomalous position of being employed by or associated
with itself.15 9 Because an enterprise cannot be employed by or associated
with itself, an enterprise may not be a person liable for injuries resulting
from violations of section 1962(c). 160
Unlike the language in section 1962(c), RICO's language in sections
1962(a) and 1962(b) does not prevent an enterprise from being a person.' 6'
Section 1962(a) states that a person violates RICO if the person receives
income from a pattern of racketeering activity and uses or invests that
income to acquire, establish, or operate an enterprise.'1 Although an
enterprise may not establish itself, an enterprise certainly may receive income
and use that income to acquire an interest in or operate itself. 63 For
example, a corporation may receive income derived from a pattern of
155. See supra notes 153-54 (stating requirements for enterprise to qualify as person under
§§ 1961 and 1962 of RICO).
156. See supra note 154 (describing relationships of persons to enterprises under §§
1962(a), 1962(b), and 1962(c) of RICO).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982); see supra note 23 (providing text of § 1962(c)).
158. See Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1359 (3d Cir. 1987)
(stating that language of § 1962(c) indicates that Congress intended person and enterprise to
be distinct entities under § 1962(c)); Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d
308, 313 (2d Cir.) (stating that language of § 1962(c) clearly envisions separate entities as
person and enterprise), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1985).
159. See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1986)
(stating that corporation may not be employed by or associated with itself under § 1962(c) of
RICO); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir.
1984) (stating that use of terms "employed by" and "associated with" requires that enterprise
must be distinct from person), aff'd per curian on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
160. Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 31 (Ist Cir. 1986);
Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 400-02 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
161. See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text (explaining why statutory language of
§§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) of RICO allows enterprise to be person).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982); see supra note 21 and accompanying text (providing text
of § 1962(a) of RICO).
163. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that corporation may invest income derived from racketeering activity in its own
operations); Pennsylvania v. Derry Constr. Co., 617 F. Supp. 940, 944-45 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(stating that logic dictates that corporation receiving income from pattern of racketeering
activity can invest that income in its own operations).
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racketeering activity and use that income to acquire its own stock or run
its own operations.' 64 Consequently, the statutory language of section 1962(a)
does not prohibit an enterprise from being liable to a private civil plaintiff.
165
Section 1962(b) is similar to section 1962(a) because section 1962(b)
prohibits a person from acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control
of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.' 66 Section 1962(b),
however, does not require that a person affect the enterprise by receiving
income derived from racketeering activity. 67 An enterprise could acquire or
maintain an interest in or control of itself through a pattern of racketeering
activity without using funds derived from the activity. 68 For example, a
labor union could violate section 1962(b) by using extortion to acquire or
maintain control of its own operations. 69 Therefore, as with section 1962(a),
the statutory language of section 1962(b) does not prohibit an enterprise
from being a person liable for damages under section 1964(c).1
70
Although the statutory language of sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) does
not prohibit the enterprise from being liable to the private civil RICO
plaintiff, courts should not hold enterprises liable if by holding enterprises
liable courts would frustrate the remedial purposes for which Congress
designated RICO.' 7' Four policy considerations, however, support the view
that courts should hold enterprises liable for violations of sections 1962(a)
and 1962(b) to effectuate the remedial purposes of RICO. First, section
1964(a) specifically indicates that Congress intended for enterprises to be
susceptible to civil sanctions.', 2 Indeed, section 1964(a) authorizes the courts
to dissolve or reorganize an enterprise to prevent or restrain violations of
164. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that corporation may be liable as person under § 1962(a) for obtaining income
from pattern of racketeering activity and using those funds in its operations); Masi v. Ford
City Bank & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that bank may be liable
under § 1962(a) for using income derived from racketeering activity); see also supra notes 92-
108 (discussing Schreiber).
165. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (discussing why enterprise may be
person under § 1962(a) of RICO).
166. Compare supra note 22 (providing text of § 1962(b)) with supra note 21 (providing
text of § 1962(a)).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982); see supra note 22 (providing text of § 1962(b)).
168. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that, unlike § 1962(a), § 1962(b) does not require showing of use money to
establish RICO violation).
169. See United States v. Local 560, Int. Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 336-37
(D.N.J. 1984) (finding that Teamsters Local 560 used extortion to maintain control of its own
operations in violation of § 1962(b) of RICO), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986).
170. Id. at 329-30 (stating that nothing on face of § 1962(b) supports finding that person
and enterprise must be mutually exclusive).
171. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
947 (stating that courts should construe liberally the provisions of RICO to effectuate RICO's
remedial purposes).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982); see supra note 17 (discussing § 1964(a)).
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section 1962.171 Congress, therefore, intended for courts to discipline enter-
prises to effectuate the remedial purposes of RICO. 174 Accordingly, to
effectuate RICO's remedial purpose of compensating parties injured by
persons conducting racketeering activity, courts should hold enterprises liable
for plaintiffs' injuries resulting from enterprises' violations of sections
1962(a) and 1962(b). 7 1
Second, in addition to compensating the injured party, Congress in-
tended the private civil remedy to have a deterrent effect on racketeering
activity. 176 In creating RICO's private civil damages provision, Congress
intended private parties to act as private attorneys general in the fight
against racketeering activity. 177 If courts allow enterprises to escape private
civil liability, courts significantly will diminish the private attorney general
function of section 1964(c). 71 If courts prevent plaintiffs from serving as
private attorneys general against enterprises conducting racketeering activity,
many guilty persons may escape liability for their racketeering acts. 79 To
promote the deterrent purposes of RICO, courts, therefore, should allow
private civil damages against enterprises when enterprises violate sections
1962(a) or 1962(b) of RICO. 80
Third, in enacting RICO Congress intended to create dramatic new
measures to deal with racketeering activity in areas in which Congress
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
174. See U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (stating that Congress designed
RICO's civil remedies to divest enterprise of fruits of racketeering activity). The United States
Supreme Court has held that Congress designed the civil remedies provided in section 1964(a)
of RICO to control the activities of both legitimate and criminal enterprises involved in
racketeering activity. Id. at 591-93; see also 116 CONG. REc. 35,193 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Poff, manager of Organized Crime Control Act in House) (stating that Congress intended
RICO to deal not only with individuals, but also with economic enterprises through which
individuals conduct racketeering activity).
175. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (stating that providing
remedy for parties injured by racketeering activity is as important as any other remedial
provision of RICO); supra note 174 and accompanying text (indicating that holding enterprises
liable for violations of § 1962 coincides with remedial purposes of RICO).
176. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (stating that Congress
designed RICO to deter racketeering activity); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593
(1981) (stating that Congress designed RICO to have preventive effect on organized crime);
116 CoN . Rac. 25,190 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan, sponsor of Organized Crime
Control Act in Senate) (stating that § 1964(c) of RICO would have great effect in eliminating
organized crime from American economy).
177. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) (stating that Congress
designed § 1964(c) as private attorney general provision of RICO). The United States Supreme
Court has stated that Congress intended the treble damages provision of section 1964(c) to be
an incentive for private parties to litigate against persons conducting racketeering activity. Id.
178. See id. (stating that without private attorney general provisions like § 1964(c),
racketeers might escape punishment completely).
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing how RICO's private civil
action is designed to deter racketeering activity).
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thought state laws were inadequate.'18  Consequently, Congress fashioned
RICO using broad, inclusive language to reach those persons participating
in racketeering activity who previously might have escaped criminal or civil
liability.8 2 Further, Congress instructed the courts to construe liberally the
broad language of RICO to effectuate RICO's remedial purposes. 183 In
enacting RICO Congress was aware of the far-reaching effects that RICO
might have on the federal courts' involvement in dealing with organized
crime.' Indeed, Congress passed RICO's broad, sweeping measures over
the objections of some legislators who wished to limit RICO's scope. 85
Consequently, the breadth of RICO has allowed plaintiffs to seek relief
from racketeers in ways not expressly anticipated by Congress. 8 ' A court,
however, should not limit a RICO plaintiff's access to private civil remedies
in situations in which Congress has provided such a remedy merely because
the court believes that Congress did not envision such a broad reading of
181. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-
23 (Statement of Findings and Purpose) (stating that Congress designed RICO to provide new
tools to supplement ineffective existing methods in fight against organized crime); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (stating that RICO was aggressive initiative
designed to supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime); Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-28 (1983) (RICO designed to provide new weapons of
unprecedented scope to enhance existing remedies in fight against organized crime); supra note
4 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to supplement existing state laws with
RICO provisions).
182. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498-98 (1985) (stating that
Congress consciously used expansive language in adopting RICO); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981) (stating that statutory language and legislative history indicate that
in enacting RICO, Congress intentionally increased federal involvement to address previously
neglected problem of organized crime); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that Congress deliberately chose broad
language for RICO's provisions to avoid loopholes through which clever defendants might
slip), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
183. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
947 (providing that courts should construe RICO liberally to effectuate RICO's remedial
purposes).
184. See 116 CoNG. RFc. 35,217 (1970) (remarks of Representative Eckhardt) (stating that
enacting RICO would move areas formerly totally within police power of states into federal
realm); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981) (stating that Congress
knew it was entering new domain of federal involvement in enacting RICO).
185. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 42, at 215 (expressing concern that reach of
Organized Crime Control Act went beyond organized criminal activity). RICO's opponents
expressed concern that the broad scope of RICO might allow abuse of RICO as a weapon
against innocent businessmen. See H.R. REP'. No. 1549, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 187 (1970) (stating
that disgruntled competitors might use RICO to harass innocent businessmen engaged in
interstate commerce).
186. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) (stating that
plaintiffs are using § 1964(c) of RICO in ways not envisioned by RICO's drafters); Haroco,
Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 397 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating
that Congress probably did not anticipate application of civil RICO to improperly calculated
interest rates by commercial bank), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
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RICO. 8 7 Only Congress properly may limit the scope of RICO. 8 s
Finally, although Congress adopted the broad language of RICO pri-
marily to eliminate the infiltration of legitimate enterprises by persons
conducting racketeering activity, Congress did not intend to confine the
reach of RICO's remedial provisions to benefit exclusively the infiltrated
enterprises.8 9 In addition to benefitting the infiltrated enterprise, Congress
designed RICO to benefit both particular parties injured as a result of
racketeering activity and the American economy in general.19° However, a
court that excludes from private civil RICO liability enterprises that, acting
as persons, violate sections 1962(a) or 1962(b) frustrates the remedial pur-
poses of RICO for the individual plaintiff and the American economy.' 9'
By not imposing liability on enterprises, the court may leave the plaintiff
injured by the racketeering activity of the enterprise with no effective remedy
for the injury. 92 Furthermore, by allowing persons participating in racket-
eering activity to go unpunished and thus to continue their activity to the
detriment of American commerce, the court may deprive the American
economy of its remedy. 93 Moreover, courts that exclude enterprises from
private civil liability for violating sections 1962(a) or 1962(b) do not protect
the legitimate enterprise that is the victim of racketeering activity and for
whose benefit Congress drafted RICO. 194 Instead, these courts protect only
187. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) (stating that
judiciary should not limit private civil RICO action merely because plaintiffs are taking
advantage of § 1964(c) in ways unforeseen by Congress); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp.
of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that when RICO's language permits liability
against culpable entity, courts should find that such liability exists); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 399 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that because Congress
deliberately chose to adopt broad language of RICO statute, in absence of constitutional
prohibitions, parties should direct complaints concerning breadth of RICO to Congress rather
than to the courts), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that judiciary should not reassess Congress'
balance of costs and benefits of RICO).
188. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (stating that only
Congress may correct any defects that might exist in RICO statute).
189. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' three reasons for
adopting RICO's civil remedies).
190. Id.
191. See infra notes 192-94 (discussing effect that disallowing enterprise liability would
have on private parties and the American economy).
192. See Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 421
(7th Cir. 1984) (stating that deep pocket of enterprise should be available to plaintiff when
enterprise is perpetrator of acts in violation of § 1962(a)), aff'd per curiam on other grounds,
473 U.S. 606 (1985).
193. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) (stating that guilty
parties may escape RICO liability altogether if courts prevent parties from acting as private
attorneys general under § 1964(c)).
194. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that holding enterprise liable for violations of §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) does not
affect enterprises victimized by racketeering activity); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402 (stating that
allowing enterprise liability under § 1962(a) reaches only enterprises that participate in and
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those enterprises that are also persons condemned by RICO. 195
To determine whether an enterprise is a person that should be liable to
a plaintiff for violating sections 1962(a) or 1962(b) of RICO, some plaintiffs
have urged courts to apply the agency principle of respondeat superior, or
vicarious liability. 196 The doctrine of vicarious liability provides that the
master is strictly liable for the tortious acts that the master's servant commits
while acting within the scope of his employment. 97 The doctrine imputes
liability for the acts of the servant to the master because the master generally
is able to compensate the injured party better than the servant, and because
the master may spread the risks of his activities to a larger portion of the
population. 98 The extent to which a federal statute embraces common law
agency principles depends, however, on the extent to which the principles
support the language and policies of the statute. 99 Although courts holding
an enterprise vicariously liable for its agent's violation of sections 1962(a)
or 1962(b) of RICO would provide a remedy for injured parties, courts
would directly contravene Congress' primary intent to benefit the enterprise
infiltrated by racketeers by applying the doctrine of vicarious liability.200
profit from racketeering rather than those enterprises that are victims of racketeering); see
also supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text (discussing Schreiber); supra notes 65-89 and
accompanying text (discussing Haroco).
195. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that holding enterprise liable as person under §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) of RICO
accords with congressional intent reaching those who ultimately benefit from racketeering
activity); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402 (stating that Congress intended for enterprise to be liable
under § 1962(a) because under § 1962(a) enterprise is liable only if enterprise is person who
ultimately profits from racketeering).
196. See Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1357 n.7 (3d Cir.
1987) (plaintiffs alleging that enterprise is liable for violating §§ 1962(a) and 1962(c) under
doctrine of respondeat superior); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d
28, 29 (1st Cir. 1986) (plaintiff alleging that corporation is liable for violating § 1962(c) of
RICO under doctrine of respondeat superior).
197. E. SELL, AGENCY § 95 (1975).
198. Id.
199. See Am. Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'r v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 569 (1982)
(stating that, absent indications that Congress did not intend antitrust law to reach so far,
antitrust cause of action is as broad as right to sue under apparent authority principles); Petro-
Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1356-58 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that
doctrine of respondeat superior applies under RICO only when structure of RICO statute does
not forbid it); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 32-33 (Ist Cir.
1986) (declining to apply respondeat superior principles to hold enterprise as person under §
1962(c) because language of RICO limits application of agency principles under § 1962(c));
Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984) (stating that normal rules of
agency law apply to RICO absent some indication that Congress had contrary intent).
200. See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 31-34 (1st Cir.
1986) (stating that courts should not use vicarious liability to accomplish indirectly what RICO
statute directly denies); Rush v. Oppenheimer, 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(stating that plaintiff may not use respondeat superior principles to impute liability to enterprise
when enterprise is mere conduit for racketeering activities); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp.
757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that enterprise may be liable as person under § 1962 only
if enterprise is actively engaged in racketeering activity rather than mere victim or conduit).
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Therefore, instead of making enterprises vicariously liable for the acts of
other persons, courts should hold enterprises liable only when enterprises
directly participate in activities that violate RICO sections 1962(a) or 1962(b). 20,
In determining whether enterprises should be liable as a person to
private plaintiffs for injuries resulting from violations of sections 1962(a)
or 1962(b) of RICO, courts should use direct liability principles similar to
the principles used to determine the culpability of a corporation for criminal
Some courts have held that respondeat superior principles should apply to hold enterprises
liable for violations of section 1962(c) of RICO. See Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp.
1279, 1283 (D. Del. 1984) (stating that respondeat superior, "at least in most instances," will
further statutory goals of RICO); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985)
(holding that respondeat superior principles impute to enterprise liability for violation of §
1962(c) by agent). Courts that have held that enterprises should be vicariously liable for their
agent's violation of section 1962(c) have failed to consider that the statutory language of
section 1962(c), which requires the person to be employed by or associated with the enterprise,
prohibits enterprise liability under section 1962(c). See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of
Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that concept of vicarious liability is directly
at odds with congressional intent behind § 1962(c)); supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text
(indicating that statutory language of § 1962(c) prohibits enterprise from being person); supra
note 14 and accompanying text (indicating that courts generally hold that enterprise may not
be person under § 1962(c)).
201. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that enterprise may be liable as person under §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) if enterprise
has engaged in predicate acts of racketeering and is direct or indirect beneficiary of racketeering
activity); supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text (discussing Schreiber). Some courts have
suggested that the language of sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) clearly indicates that a person
must be an active participant in the pattern of racketeering to be liable under RICO. See id.
(stating that under both §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b), enterprise must participate in racketeering
acts and be beneficiary of those acts). Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 422 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that person under § 1962(a) is perpetrator
of racketeering activity), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); United
States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that requirement that person
must participate as principal to violate § 1962(a) shields innocent recipients of racketeer's
investments from liability). One commentator has noted that because- section 1962(a) states
that only a principal may be liable for receiving funds derived from racketeering activity, and
because sections 1962(b) and 1962(c) require a person to acquire control of or conduct an
enterprise through racketeering, that only active participants should be directly liable for
racketeering activity. Note, supra note 13, at 596 (stating that language of §§ 1962(a), 1962(b),
and 1962(c) require person to actively participate in racketeering activity to be liable under
RICO). This commentator argues that direct liability should extend to enterprises for violations
of section 1962(c) of RICO. Id. at 596-605. The commentator failed to recognize, however,
that because a person must be employed by or associated with an enterprise under section
1962(c), an enterprise may not be liable as a person under section 1962(c). See Schofield v.
First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 743 F.2d 28, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that enterprise
may not be directly liable as person under § 1962(c)); supra note 151 and accompanying text
(stating that enterprise may be liable for RICO violation only if enterprise is person); supra
notes 157-60 and accompanying text (indicating that statutory language of § 1962(c) prohibits
enterprise from being person); supra note 14 and accompanying text (indicating that courts
generally hold that enterprise may not be person under § 1962(c)); supra note 199 and
accompanying text (stating that common law principles only apply to federal statutes insofar
as principles support language and policy of statutes).
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violations. 202 Courts use direct liability principles in criminal proceedings
because criminal proceedings require a level of intent to establish guilt.20 3
The corporation's culpability is not dependent on the criminal guilt or
innocence of its employee.3 Indeed, a corporation may be guilty of a
criminal violation despite the innocence of its agent who performs the illegal
act. 201 Instead, the court must determine whether the corporation had the
requisite intent to perform the illegal act and whether the evidence shows
that the corporation deliberately and knowingly performed the elements of
the offense.3 Courts find corporate enterprises criminally liable for the
illegal acts of their employees when the acts are, first, related to and
committed within the course of employment, second, committed in further-
ance of the business of the corporation, and, third, authorized by or
acquiesced in by the corporation. 207
If courts use direct liability principles to determine enterprise liability
for violations of RICO sections 1962(a) and 1962(b), courts will impose
liability only on the enterprise that is the active perpetrator of the racket-
eering activity. 208 Courts that *hold liable for private civil RICO damages
enterprises that directly violate sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) of RICO will
promote congressional intent by providing a remedy for parties injured by
202. See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 31-34 (1st Cir. 1986)
(using direct liability principles to hold that enterprise may be liable for violation of § 1962(a));
Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-WeU Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that enterprise may be liable as person under §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) if enterprise engages in
racketeering activity and benefits from that activity); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that enterprise may be liable under §
1962(a) if enteiprise is perpetrator of racketeering activity), aff'd per curiam on other grounds,
473 U.S. 606 (1985); Note, supra note 13, at 596-605 (reasoning that courts should use direct,
rather than vicarious, liability principles to hold enterprises liable for violations of §§ 1962(a),
1962(b), and 1962(c)); 10 W. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDiA OF THE LAW OF PrvATE
CORPoRAioNs § 4942 at 664,66 (1986) (discussing criminal liability of corporations); supra
note 201 and accompanying text (noting that enterprise may not be directly liable as person
for violation of § 1962(c) because enterprise may not be person under § 1962(c)).
203. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 202, § 4942 st 665 (stating that courts must establish
requisite level of intent to hold corporations liable for criminal violation); see also Standard Oil
Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (stating that corporation may
be guilty of criminal acts only if corporations deliberately performed those acts).
204. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 202, at § 4942 at 664-66 (stating that corporation may
be liable for crime regardless of whether corporation's agents are themselves liable for crime
for which corporation is charged); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411
(7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
205. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.) (noting
that corporation may be guilty of conspiracy although its agents are innocent ), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941).
206. See Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962)
(stating that corporation may be criminally liable for acts of its agents only if corporation
knows its agents are performing acts on its behalf).
207. W. FLETCHER, supra note 202, at § 4942 at p. 664.
208. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (stating that direct liability theory
requires that enterprise knowingly and willingly participate in racketeering activity, rather than
imputing liability for acts of agent to enterprise).
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the enterprise's racketeering activity and by helping to deter violations of
RICO by enterprises. 201 Furthermore, the enterprise that is the passive victim
of racketeering infiltration that Congress designed RICO to protect will not
be liable under direct liability principles.
210
V. Conclusion
Federal courts generally agree that a private civil plaintiff may not
recover from an enterprise for injuries resulting from a violation of section
1962(c) of RICO. 21' The federal courts disagree, however, on whether a
private civil plaintiff may recover from an enterprise under sections 1962(a)
or 1962(b) of RICO. 212 Unlike the language of section 1962(c), the statutory
language of sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) does not prohibit an enterprise
from being a person liable to a private civil plaintiff.2 3 Moreover, the
legislative history and policy considerations of RICO indicate that Congress
intended for an enterprise to be liable to the private civil plaintiff when an
enterprise directly participates in racketeering activity prohibited by sections
1962(a) and 1962(b) of RICO.214 If courts hold liable for private civil
damages only enterprises that are directly responsible for violating sections
1962(a) or 1962(b), courts will satisfy congressional intent by compensating
injured parties and deterring racketeering activity without harming enter-
prises that are victims of racketeering activity.215 Courts, therefore, should
allow private civil plaintiffs to recover damages from an enterprise when
the enterprise injures the plaintiff by directly violating section 1962(a) or
1962(b) of RICO.
JAmns D. HIGGAsON, JR.
209. See supra notes 191-97 (stating that courts should hold enterprises liable for violations
of §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) to compensate plaintiffs and to help rermove racketeering influence
from American economy).
210. See Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th
Cir. 1986) (stating that holding enterprises liable for violations of §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) of
RICO will reach persons who actually benefit from racketeering activity, rather than those
parties that are victims of racketeering activity); Haroco, Inc. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that holding enterprise liable under
§ 1962(a) will achieve Congress' intent to reach parties who profit from racketeering activity,
rather than victims of racketeering); supra note 40 and accompanying text (stating that primary
purpose of RICO is to protect victim enterprise that is infiltrated by racketeers).
211. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that vast majority of federal circuit
courts have held that enterprise may not be person under § 1962(c)).
212. See supra notes 65-141 (discussing different interpretations of whether enterprise may
be liable as person for violations of §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b)).
213. See supra notes 161-65 (stating that § 1962(a) does not prohibit person from being
enterprise); supra notes 166-70 (stating that § 1962(b) does not prohibit person from being
enterprise).
214. See supra notes 172-95 (discussing policy reasons for holding enterprise liable to
private plaintiff for injuries resulting from violations of §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b)).
215. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (stating that holding enterprise civilly
liable to private plaintiff will compensate plaintiff and reduce racketeering activity without
harming legitimate enterprises infiltrated by racketeers).
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